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Accounting for the Great Depression
By V. V. CHARI, PATRICK J. KEHOE, AND ELLEN R. MCGRATTAN*
The Great Depression is not yet well under-
stood. Economists have offered many theories
for both the massive decline and the slow re-
covery of output during 1929–1939, but no
consensus has formed on the main forces behind
this major economic event. Here we describe
and demonstrate a simple methodology for de-
termining which types of theories are the most
promising.
Several prominent theories blame the Great
Depression on frictions in labor and capital mar-
kets. The sticky-wage theory is that wage stick-
iness together with a monetary contraction
produces a downturn in output (see Michael
Bordo et al., 2000). The cartelization theory is
that an increase in cartelization and unioniza-
tion leads to a slow recovery (see Harold Cole
and Lee Ohanian, 2001). The investment-
friction theory is that monetary contractions in-
crease frictions in capital markets that produce
investment-driven downturns in output (see Ben
Bernanke and Mark Gertler, 1989; Charles
Carlstrom and Timothy Fuerst, 1997). We think
the critical feature of both the sticky-wage and
cartelization theories is that their frictions lead
to a wedge between the marginal rate of substi-
tution between leisure and consumption and the
marginal product of labor. The critical feature
of the investment-friction theory is that capital-
market frictions introduce a wedge between
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
in consumption and the marginal product of
capital.
We show that the aggregate properties of a
class of models with sticky wages and with
cartels or unions are the same as those of a
growth model with suitably constructed taxes
on labor. We also show that a class of models
with investment frictions is equivalent in terms
of aggregate properties to a growth model with
suitably constructed taxes on investment. We
then consider an input-friction theory in which
frictions in financing inputs lead to a wedge
between aggregate inputs and outputs. Such
models have the same aggregate properties as a
growth model with suitably constructed produc-
tivity (see Raphael Bergoeing et al. [2002] for
other frictions that show up as time-varying
productivity). These observations lead us to
conclude that a large class of business-cycle
models are equivalent to a prototype growth
model with time-varying wedges that, at least at
face value, look like time-varying labor taxes,
investment taxes, and productivity. We refer to
these wedges as labor wedges, investment
wedges, and efficiency wedges.
These equivalence results lead us to propose
a method for accounting for economic fluctua-
tions in general: business-cycle accounting. We
first use a parameterized prototype growth
model to measure in the data the wedges we
have identified.1 We then feed the values of
these wedges back into the growth model to
conduct our accounting exercise, namely, to
assess what fraction of the output movements
can be attributed to each wedge separately and
in combination. (In a deterministic model, by
construction, all three wedges account for all of
the observed movements in output.)
The goal of this business-cycle accounting is
to guide researchers to focus on developing
detailed models with the kinds of frictions that
can deliver the quantitatively relevant types of
observed wedges in the prototype economy. For
example, both the sticky-wage and cartelization
theories are promising explanations of the ob-
served labor wedges, while the simplest models
of capital-market frictions are not. Theorists
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attempting to develop models of particular
channels through which shocks cause large
fluctuations in output will benefit from asking
whether those channels are consistent with the
fluctuations in wedges that we document.
Our accounting yields clear results for the
Great Depression: Almost all of the decline in
output from 1929 to 1933 is due to a combina-
tion of efficiency wedges and labor wedges,
while much of the slow recovery from 1933 to
1939 is due to labor wedges alone. Investment
wedges play, at best, a minor role in the decline
and recovery.
While numerous theories lead to labor wedges,
relatively few lead to efficiency wedges. We
find it uninteresting to view the efficiency
wedge as emanating from a loss of knowledge
or a decline in the quality of blueprints. Rather,
we think the observed movements in measured
productivity are the results of poor government
policies interacting with shocks. These policies
turn what otherwise would be modest down-
turns into prolonged depressions. Developing
models with these properties is the key to un-
locking the mysteries of the Great Depression.
I. Equivalence Results
Here we show how various models with un-
derlying distortions map into a prototype econ-
omy with one or more wedges. We choose
simple models to illustrate this mapping. Since
many models map into the same configuration
of wedges, identifying one particular configura-
tion does not uniquely identify a model; rather,
it identifies a whole class of models consistent
with that configuration. In this sense, our method
does not uniquely determine the most promising
model; rather it guides researchers to focus on
the key margins that need to be distorted.
The prototype economy is a growth model
with three stochastic variables (our “wedges”):
At, 1  t, and 1  xt. Using standard
notation, we say that consumers maximize Et ¥t
tU(ct, t) subject to
ct  1  xt kt  1  1  kt 
 1  t wtt  rt kt  Tt .
Firms maximize AtF(kt, t)  rtkt  wtt. The
equilibrium is summarized by the resource con-
straint, ct  kt1 	 yt  (1  )kt, together
with
(1) yt  At Fkt ,  t 
(2) UtUct  1  t At Ft
3 1 xt Uct  Et Uct 1 At 1 Fkt 1
 1  xt 1 1  ].
We call At the efficiency wedge, 1  t the
labor wedge, and 1/(1  xt) the investment
wedge.
A. Efficiency Wedges
Our input-friction theory has a simple deter-
ministic economy with financing frictions that
lead to distortions in the allocation of inputs
across two types of firms. Before firms can
produce, both types must borrow to pay for an
input, say, labor. Firms of the first type, located
in sector 1, are financially constrained in that
they must pay a higher price for borrowing than
do firms of the second type, located in sector 2.
We think of these frictions as capturing the idea
that some firms, which can be thought of as
small, find borrowing harder than others do.
One source of the higher price paid by the
financially constrained firms is that moral-
hazard problems are more severe for small
firms. (While this theory is reminiscent of that
of Bernanke and Gertler [1989], the margins
that get distorted in our model and in theirs are
quite different.)
In each period t, firms borrow at the begin-
ning of the period to finance inputs and repay
their loans at the end of the period. Final output
yt is produced from the outputs of sectors 1 and
2, y1t and y2t, according to yt 	 y1t y2t1. The
representative firm producing final output max-
imizes y1t y2t1  p1ty1t  p2ty2t, where pit is
the price of the output of sector i. Firms in
sector i hire labor it to produce output accord-
ing to yit 	 it and maximize pitit  Ritwtit,
where wt is the wage rate and Rit is the gross
interest rate paid on loans by firms in sector i.
We imagine that firms in sector 1 are more
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financially constrained than those in sector 2, so
that R1t 
 R2t. Let Rit 	 Rt(1  it), where Rt
is the rate savers earn and it measures the
wedge, induced by financing constraints, be-
tween the rate paid to savers and the rate paid
by borrowers in sector i. Since savers do not
discount utility within the period, Rt 	 1. Con-
sumers choose consumption ct and labor t to
maximize ¥t	0 tU(ct, t) subject to ct 	
wtt  t, where t is the period t profits
earned by firms. The resource constraints are
t 	 1t  2t and ct 	 yt.
We specialize our prototype economy to have
a fixed capital stock normalized to 1 and con-
sider any period. In Chari et al. (2002a), we
prove the following.
PROPOSITION 1: The equilibrium allocations
for an economy with input financing frictions
coincide with those of the prototype economy




1  2t 1  1  1t 1  
1  1  1t   1  2t 
and 1  t 	 [/(1  1t)]  [(1  )/(1  2t)].
Suppose that the fluctuations in the underly-
ing distortions 1t and 2t are such that the
constructed 1  t is constant. That is, on
average, financing frictions are unchanged, but
relative frictions fluctuate. An outside observer
using a one-sector growth model to fit the data
generated by the economy with input financing
frictions would identify the fluctuations in rel-
ative distortions with fluctuations in technology
and would see no fluctuations in the labor tax
rate. In particular, periods in which the rela-
tive distortions increase would be misinter-
preted as periods of technological regress. We
thus want a more neutral label than “technolo-
gy” for At. We call it the efficiency wedge since it
is a simple measure of aggregate production
efficiency.
More generally, fluctuations in the input fi-
nancing wedges 1t and 2t, which lead to fluc-
tuations in t, show up in the prototype
economy as fluctuations in both the efficiency
wedge At and the labor wedge 1  t.
B. Labor Wedges
Now consider two economies that give rise to
labor wedges. In one, wages are sticky, so that
fluctuations in monetary policy induce fluctua-
tions in output. In the other, unions have
monopoly power, so that fluctuations in the
government’s pro-competitive policies toward
unions induce fluctuations in output.
Consider a sticky-wage economy with utility
function U and production function F, and let
U*t/U*ctF*t be evaluated at the equilibrium
of this economy. In Chari et al. (2002a), we
prove the following.
PROPOSITION 2: The aggregate allocations
in a prototype economy with taxes on labor
income given by 1  t 	 U*t/U*ctF*t
coincide with those of the sticky-wage economy.
We call the constructed labor tax rate 1  t
the labor wedge. This wedge reflects the gap
between the marginal product of labor and the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure
and consumption in the intratemporal first-order
condition for labor. An outside observer using
the prototype economy to fit the data of the
sticky-wage economy would interpret output
fluctuations that arise from fluctuations in mon-
etary policy as arising from fluctuations in labor
wedges.
An exactly analogous proposition holds for
an economy with monopoly unions. An outside
observer of a unionized economy would inter-
pret output fluctuations arising from fluctuations
in the government’s pro-competitive policies as
arising from fluctuations in labor wedges.
C. Investment Wedges
For investment frictions, the link between the
original economy and a prototype economy is
immediate. Many of the frictions discussed in
the literature end up affecting the economy by
raising the firms’ cost of investment, from 1 to
1  xt. These show up in the prototype econ-
omy as an investment wedge, a gap between the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in
consumption and the marginal product of capi-
tal in equation (3).
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and others have
pointed to agency costs as the source of invest-
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ment distortions. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
embed the frictions studied by Bernanke and
Gertler into a standard growth model. In Chari
et al. (2002a), we find, as Carlstrom and Fuerst
do, that the Carlstrom-Fuerst model is equiva-
lent to the prototype growth model with in-
vestment wedges and adjustment costs in
investment. Most interesting, we think, is that
the equivalent prototype model has neither ef-
ficiency wedges nor labor wedges.
II. Business-Cycle Accounting
Now we try to measure our three wedges
and determine how much of actual U.S. out-
put fluctuations they can account for. (For
details underlying this section, see Chari et al.
[2002b].)
Given data on yt, kt, t, and ct, we use
equations (1)–(3) to construct series for effi-
ciency and labor wedges. In Figure 1 we display
real detrended output, the detrended efficiency
wedge, and the labor wedge. All the series are
normalized to equal 100 in 1929. As is clear in
Figure 1, output is 35 percent below trend in
1933 and is still 20 percent below trend by
1939. In 1933, the efficiency wedge is 17 per-
cent below trend, but by 1939 it has essentially
recovered to trend. In 1933, the labor wedge is
28 percent lower than its 1929 level, and in
1939 it is still that low. Thus, the underlying
distortions that manifested themselves as effi-
ciency and labor wedges became substantially
worse from 1929 to 1933. By 1939, the effi-
ciency wedge had disappeared, but the labor
wedge remained as large as it had been in 1933.
If we assume no uncertainty, we can use
equation (3) to measure the investment wedge
as well. With that assumption, however, we
find that 1/(1  xt) is higher than its 1929
level throughout the 1930’s: according to this
measurement, the underlying distortions that
manifested themselves as investment wedges
actually diminished in the Great Depression.
This conclusion is not plausible; hence, we
will propose an alternative method for assess-
ing investment wedges.
A. The Prototype Economy with Efficiency
and Labor Wedges
First, we ask: What fraction of output fluctu-
ations can be accounted for by the efficiency
and labor wedges? We answer this question by
simulating our prototype economy with our
measured wedges and comparing the result to
actual U.S. data. We find that together these
wedges can account for essentially all of the
fluctuations in U.S. output between 1929 and
1939.
We start by independently inserting the se-
ries for each of the two wedges into the pro-
totype model and setting the other wedges to
their 1929 levels. We assume that consumers
believe that in each year from 1930 through
1932 it is equally likely that, in the following
year, the wedges will stay at their current
levels, revert to the 1929 levels, or take on the
values in the data. From 1933 on, we assume
perfect foresight.
With the efficiency wedge alone, the proto-
type economy generates much of the observed
downturn in output, but much too rapid a recov-
ery. As can be seen in Figure 2, for example, by
1933 output falls about 26 percent in the model
and about 35 percent in the data. By 1939, the
efficiency-wedge model generates an output de-
cline of only 6 percent rather than the observed
20 percent. As can also be seen in Figure
2, the reason for this rapid recovery is that the
efficiency-wedge model completely misses the
continued sluggishness in labor from 1933 on-
ward. For investment, this model shows a sim-
ilar fall as in the data from 1929 to 1933, but a
FIGURE 1. U.S. OUTPUT AND MEASURED EFFICIENCY
AND LABOR WEDGES
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faster recovery. Here and throughout, labor is
per capita man-hours, while investment is de-
trended and normalized by output in 1929.
In our model with only labor wedges, out-
put falls only about half as much by 1933 as
output actually fell: 17 percent vs. 35 percent.
By 1939, output in both this model and the
data have fallen about 20 percent. The labor-
wedge model misses the sharp decline in in-
vestment from 1929 to 1933, but it does
generate the sluggishness in labor input after
1933.
These observations suggest investigating a
prototype economy with both efficiency and
labor wedges. We thus simulate an economy
with our constructed series for these two
wedges with the investment wedge set to its
1929 level. Figure 3 shows that the result-
ing model captures both the downturn in
output and the slow recovery remarkably
well. It also generates the sluggishness in
labor after 1933 and does reasonably well on
investment.
B. The Prototype Economy
with Investment Wedges
What fraction of output fluctuations can
be accounted for by the investment wedge?
Our difficulties in inferring a reasonable level
of that wedge from the U.S. data make us
wary of trying to answer this question by
simply putting in the wedge 1/(1  xt)
inferred from a deterministic version of equa-
tion (3). Instead, we consider a prototype
economy with the efficiency and labor wedges
set to their 1929 levels and let the invest-
ment wedge be whatever it must be in order
for the model to generate the actual invest-
ment series. In a sense, by attributing all
movements in investment to this wedge, we
are overstating its contribution to output
fluctuations.
In Figure 4, we see that the prototype econ-
omy with an investment wedge generates only
a modest fall in output from 1929 to 1933 and
does not generate the recovery after 1933.
FIGURE 2. MODELS WITH ONE WEDGE FIGURE 3. MODEL WITH EFFICIENCY AND LABOR WEDGES
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While this economy does generate a recovery
in labor, the effect on output is offset because
the capital stock is lower due to the cumula-
tive effect of the decade-long investment
slump.
III. Conclusion
Our business-cycle accounting suggests
that research on the Great Depression should
focus on building detailed models with un-
derlying distortions that produce efficiency
and labor wedges. Building models of investment
wedges is not likely to yield a high payoff.
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